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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
All parties to the proceeding are identified in the caption on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78A-3-
102(3). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE L: Did the trial court err in construing the Agreement to restrict the 
obligation of Colbert to pay $90,000.00 only if Colbert fully developed the subject 
real property to the specific exclusion of the circumstance where Colbert sold or 
assigned the property? Standard of review and preservation: All conclusions of 
law are reviewed for correctness, granting the district court no deference. WebBank 
v. American General Annuity Serv. Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1143 (Utah 2002); Dansie 
v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowner Assoc, 92 P.3d 162, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
The interpretation of a contract is an issue of law which the appellate courts review 
for correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the trial court. Encon Utah, 
LLC, v. Flour Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P.3d 263, 269 (Utah 2009). The 
application of law to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact which the appeals 
court reviews for correctness, granting the trial court discretion in its application of 
the law to a given fact situation. Covey v. Covey, 80P.3d553,558 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003). Where the language of the contract is deemed ambiguous, the interpretation 
of the contract becomes a factual matter and the review of appeals court is strictly 
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limited. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy City, 2010 Utah Ct. App 201, f 7. This issue 
was preserved through evidence presented at trial and was again raised in Florence's 
Motion for a New Trial. (R4121) 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court err in finding Colbert's interpretation of the 
Agreement's terms to be reasonable and more consistent with the language 
contained within the Agreement and the context surrounding its creation? Standard 
of review and preservation: Questions of fact are reviewed for clear error and may 
be set aside only if against the clear weight of the evidence. Dansie v. Hi-Country 
Estate Homeowners Assoc, 92 P.3d 162 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). This issue was 
preserved through evidence presented at trial and was again raised in Florence's 
Motion for a New Trial. (R412) 
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES, AND ORDINANCES 
There are no applicable statutes, rules or ordinances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
This contract case was tried to the Court on May 7, 2009. At the conclusion 
1
 R cites refer to the court record. TR cites refer to the trial transcript. 
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of the trial the Court asked each party to prepare proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The Court entered its "Ruling" on August 9, 2009, dismissing 
Plaintiffs claim. (R 385-393) Florence appealed the Court's ruling, but since the 
Court's ruling did not expressly state that no other order is necessary, the appeals 
court, on its own motion, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that 
the Court's ruling was not an appealable final order. (R 406) Plaintiff filed a motion 
for a new trial. (R 412-442) On March 29, 2010, the trial Court entered its "Final 
Ruling," denying Plaintiffs request for a new trial and dismissing Plaintiffs claims 
and this appeal was taken. (R 514-524 and Appendix "A") 
Statement of Facts 
In August, 2005, Chad Colbert obtained a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
(REPC) interest in a parcel of property in Idaho. (R 28-34, 53-59, 212-218 and 
Appendix "B") The party named in the REPC is "Chad Colbert and or Assigns." A 
typed clause of the REPC reads as follows: 
"$100,000 EARNEST MONEY TO BECOxME NONREFUNDABLE 
AFTER 30 DAY DUE DILENGENCE (sic) PERIOD STARTING 
THE DAY AFTER THE CONTRACT IS OFFICIALLY SIGNED 
BY BOTH PARTIES. ALL WATER AND MINERAL RIGHTS TO 
REMAIN WITH THE PROPERTY. SELLER TO CLOSE ON 
PROPERTY 30 DAYS AFTER THE 30 DAY DUE DILLEGENCE 
(sic) PERIOD." 
The REPC was signed by Seller on August 30, 2005. On September 21st, 
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Colbert, together with his partner, Greg Young, asked Florence for a loan of 
$90,000.00. (TR10-17; 64-69) A written agreement entitled "escrow money 
agreement" (Agreement) was signed by Florence and Colbert and Florence paid 
$90,000.00. (P l2 and Appendix "C"; TR 14-16) The entire text of the Agreement 
reads as follows: 
Escrow money agreement entered into this 21st day of September 2005 
On Property at 1788 Highway 95 Council ID, 83612 Parcel # 
R3283900000 
This escrow money agreement between Chad Colbert & Greg Young 
("the borrowers") and Casey Florence ("the lender") is for $90,000.00 
ninety thousand dollars. 
Terms: 
Chad Colbert & Greg Young, jointly and severally promise to pay the 
original amount of $90,000.00 together with interest at the rate of 12% 
annually with a 3 point fee if the project is not closed by October 24, 
2005 which date is the agreed repayment date. If borrowers close said 
project, borrowers agree to pay the lender this original loan amount 
plus an additional $90,000.00. (ninety thousand dollars), payable 14 
days after closing. 
The Agreement was signed only by Chad Colbert and Casey Florence. On 
November 14, 2005, Colbert assigned his entire interest in the REPC, and the 
subject real property for $1,045,000.00. (D 3; D 4; TR 79, 82-83) On November 
30th Colbert paid Florence $100,000. (P 2; TR 18) This payment was in excess of 
interest at 12% per annum plus three points, calculated as of November 30th, but is 
2
 P cites to Plaintiffs exhibit. D cites to Defendant's exhibit. 
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obviously less than $180,000.00. The issue in this case is whether this payment 
satisfied Colbert's obligations under the agreement or whether Colbert owes 
Florence an additional $80,000.00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's construction of the written agreement fails to give meaning 
to all of its express terms, fails to construe the agreement as a whole, and constitutes 
a rewriting of the agreement. The trial court's finding that Colbert's interpretation 
of the agreement as a "typical hard money loan" is more reasonable and consistent 
with the intent of the parties is not supported by the evidence presented at trial and 
is clearly erroneous when viewed in the light of all the contract terms, facts and 
evidence presented in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE AGREEMENT 
TO REQUIRE COLBERT TO PAY $180,000.00 ONLY IF COLBERT 
OBTAINED THE FINANCING TO FULLY DEVELOP THE 
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY. 
In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court held that the Agreement required 
Colbert to repay $180,000.00 only if he obtained "the required financing to purchase 
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the Property and develop the project." (R 522-523 and Appendix "A") Because 
Colbert assigned the property for $1,045,000.00, instead of purchasing and 
developing it, Plaintiffs claim for the unpaid $80,000.00 was dismissed. To reach 
this conclusion, it was necessary for the court to ignore the language of the 
Agreement designating it as an "escrow money agreement" and designating October 
24, 2005, as the "agreed repayment date." This conclusion specifically excludes the 
closing of the assignment of the property as a closing of the project. 
Construing the Agreement as a Whole 
This is a case of contract interpretation. It can be resolved using the basic 
rules of contract interpretation. The obligation of the court is to find the intent of 
the parties. The court looks first, "to the four corners of the agreement to determine 
the intentions of the parties." Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Assoc, 
40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2002) Where there is ambiguity in the writing, the court 
may access parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity. However, the mere availability 
of parol evidence does not free the court to jettison the writing. The court is 
obligated to seek an outcome that gives meaning to all of the terms of the 
agreement. Encon Utah, LLC, v. Flour Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P.3d 263, 269 
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(Utah 2009) As the court said in Encon, "In interpreting a contract, we look for a 
reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision 
meaningless." 
In Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), the 
court had access to both the testimony of the parties and the written agreement. The 
Supreme Court noted, "When a question arises regarding a written document, the 
first source of the inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its entirety." Id. 
at 749. In determining the intention of the parties the Court is obligated to "examine 
the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other and give a reasonable 
construction of the contract as a whole." Gillmor v. Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 65 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2005) As the Appeals Court said in Gillmor, "[i]t is axiomatic that a 
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its 
terms, which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." Id. The court 
is not free to ignore specific written terms or to rewrite the agreement to obtain a 
result the court finds "reasonable." 
In this case, the written Agreement designates October 24, 2005 as the 
"agreed repayment date." The agreement is said to be an "escrow money 
agreement." Florence loaned $90,000 which was used as earnest money under a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC). The REPC provided that the earnest money 
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was to become "nonrefundable" after 30 days. Florence understood the term 
"escrow money agreement" to mean that if his loan of $90,000.00 was returned to 
him before it became non-refundable under the terms of the REPC, Colbert need 
only pay points and interest. (TR 16-17; 23, 24; 84-85) Florence also understood 
the Agreement to mean that if his money was repaid before October 24 , Colbert's 
obligation was limited to points and interest. (TR 39-40) Rather than being returned 
out of escrow, Florence's money was used to secure the interest in the property 
which Colbert eventually assigned at a profit. (P 3) The court's conclusion, allows 
Colbert to pay only points and interest even though repaid after October 24 and 
after the obligation under the REPC had become non-refundable, from the proceeds 
of the assignment, giving no effect to either the deadline or the escrow language. 
Nor does the court's ruling explain how or why this should be the case, except to 
assert that the terms "closing" and "project" are susceptible to more than one 
meaning. No mention is made in the court's findings or conclusions as to how the 
repayment date or escrow terms were to be understood. 
The Ordinary Meaning of Terms. 
Furthermore, the court's conclusion restricts "closing" from meaning the 
closing that actually did bring this project to a close when Colbert assigned the 
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property. (D 3, D 4) The party designated as buyer in the REPC was "Chad Colbert 
and or Assigns." The usual and normal meaning of closing would have included the 
closing of the assignment of the REPC as well as the closing of the purchase of the 
property unless specifically restricted. Nothing in the written agreement eliminates 
this interpretation. 
In construing terms, the ordinary meaning of the terms is to be used unless it 
is shown that the restrictive meaning is "so generally known in the community that. 
• . . actual individual knowledge of it may be inferred." Frigaliment Importing Co., 
v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) quoting 
9 WlGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) 2464. In 1924, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressed the rule as follows: "the best construction is that which is made by 
viewing the subject of the contract, as the mass of mankind would view it; for it may 
be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves viewed 
it." Udy v. Jensen, 111 P.597 (Utah 1924) See also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Revised 
Ed 1998, Volume 5, Ch. 24. 
The written agreement between the parties provides that Florence is entitled 
to $90,000.00, "if borrowers close said project." A real estate closing did take place 
where Colbert assigned the subject property for $1,000,000.00. (P 3) This 
assignment disposed of all of Colbert's interest in all the subject real property. The 
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trial court's ruling excludes this transaction from qualifying as a closing of the 
project, holding that, "Colbert did not close on the project (obtain the required 
financing to purchase the Property and develop the project) but assigned his 
purchase interest.. . . " (R 522-523; Appendix "A") Clearly this transaction would 
qualify in normal usage of the terms as a closing of the project. Colbert himself 
understood this to be a closing. (TR 79, 87-89; see also P 3 copy of Seller's Closing 
Statement) Only if a highly restrictive interpretation is imposed on the terms 
"closing" and "project" would the closing of the assignment not qualify as a closing 
of the project. Yet no such restrictive interpretation is even hinted at in the terms of 
the written agreement. And Colbert testified that he never informed Florence of his 
restricted interpretation. (TR 85-87) The mere narration by Colbert of his plans for 
the property did not remove the possibility that an assignment of the property might 
take place. However the term project is defined, it cannot be denied that the 
assignment of Colbert's entire interest in the real property brought this project to a 
close. In Vulcan Steel Corp,, v.Markosian, 462 P.2d 166, (Utah 1969) the court 
held that the intent of the parties must be determined by an "objective and 
reasonable construction of the whole contract." Any objective meaning for the term 
"close" would include the close which actually took place, especially when 
considered in light of the other contract terms regarding deadline for the repayment 
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of the money. Colbert's subjective intent regarding the development of the property 
should not be the definition of closing. 
Rewriting the Agreement, 
The trial court's ruling can be seen as an understandable attempt to give 
effect to the sensation that $90,000.00 is too much money to pay for a loan of only 
some 70 days duration.3 Where the intention of the parties to enter into an 
agreement requiring a 100% premium is clear, as it is in this case, the court is not 
free to rewrite the agreement to conform to what the court might view as reasonable. 
This is especially true where the court is viewing the transaction after the fact, 
where the pressures and risks have dissipated and the consequences are known. 
Nonetheless, when the Court sought to divine what might be reasonable, it strayed 
from its duty in this case which is to discern and implement the intent of the parties. 
Corbin on Contracts states: 
A court is never justified in altering or perverting the language in 
order to produce a result that it regards as more just and equitable. 
Extrinsic evidence is admissible to aid in the process of interpretation, 
3
 In its initial Findings of Fact and conclusions of law, the trial court stated that 
Colbert's interpretation was more "commercially reasonable." (R 389). After 
Florence's initial appeal and motion for new trial pointed out that there was no 
definition of commercially reasonable in the record, the court deleted this language 
from its Final Ruling. 
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to determine the meaning that the parties actually gave to a term, and 
to expound and enforce the contract that the parties actually intended 
to make. Such evidence is never relevant or admissible when offered 
for the purpose of establishing another meaning or intention and to 
expound and enforce a different contract. 
Corbin on Contracts, Revised Ed. 1998, Vol. 5 § 24.6, p 29. 
In Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982), 
the court stated the Utah law on this matter as follows: "It is a long-standing rule in 
Utah that persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms 
without the intervention of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad 
bargain." Again the court in Hal Taylor Assoc, quoted Dalton v. Jerico 
Construction Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) as follows: "It is not for a court to 
rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the 
bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable principles." 
It is Florence's position that the agreement between the parties is not 
unreasonable, commercially or otherwise. Florence was asked to loan $90,000.00 
immediately, with no opportunity to do due diligence. The loan was unsecured. 
Given the fact that Florence's funds constituted 90% of the funds placed at risk in 
the REPC and the fact that Colbert recovered one million dollars from the 
assignment of the property, it is not unreasonable for Florence to make a profit on 
his investment of $90,000.00. There is no dispute that both parties to this agreement 
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understood Florence's loan was intended as only of short duration. Yet the contract 
provides that Florence stood to double his money if not repaid by October 24 ' 
when the project closed. It was therefore the intent of the parties that Florence 
should recover a premium of $90,000.00 for a short term investment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING COLBERT'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT REASONABLE AND 
CONSISTENT WITH THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND THE 
CONTEXT SURROUNDING ITS CREATION. 
After narrating the positions of each of the parties, the trial court found that: 
Colbert's interpretation of the Agreement's terms is reasonable and 
more consistent with the language contained within the Agreement and the 
context surrounding it's (sic) creation. Moreover, the Court finds that the 
evidence supports Colbert's testimony because his actions were consistent 
with his stated intention of acquiring and developing the Property (the project 
and his stated understanding of the Agreement.... (R 520; Appendix "A") 
The court noted, "Colbert testified that he entered into the Agreement 
with Florence anticipating a typical 'hard money' lending arrangement in which he 
agreed to pay points and interest for a short-term loan." (R 519; Appendix "A") 
Appellant contends that this finding is contradicted by the express language of the 
written agreement and by the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial and is 
clearly erroneous. 
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Evidence that Supports the Court's Finding (Marshalling). 
After assigning the property, Colbert paid Florence $100,000. This payment 
exceeds the interest rate term provided in the agreement. 4 At trial, Florence argued 
that this showed Colbert's understanding that more than principal and interest were 
due, but the court found this payment to be incorrectly computed interest plus an 
attempt by Colbert to curry Florence's good will for possible future dealings. (TR 
80; R 521) The appeals court, which did not observe the testimony of the 
witnesses, cannot upset this finding. Florence's interpretation of the agreement 
requires payment of $90,000.00 for what turned out to be a loan of 70 days. 
There is no dispute that Colbert anticipated and worked toward the full 
development of the subject property. (TR 60-62, 69-70, 85-86) The trial court was 
clearly impressed by the effort put forth by Colbert to find, develop and finance the 
property. Florence was made aware of these efforts during the negotiation of the 
agreement between the parties. (TR 23) Both parties understood that at least one 
method for closing the project would have been for Colbert to obtain long term 
financial and proceed with the development of the project. Colbert testified that he 
understood the phrase "close the project" to mean purchasing the property and 
developing it. (TR 70, 85-86) 
4
 A 3 point amount would be $2,700, and 12% interest would be approximately 
$3,676, as of November, 2005. 
14 
The written agreement on which Florence's claim is based is not a model of 
clarity or completeness. Although it claims to be an escrow agreement, no escrow 
agent is required and the terms of the escrow are not set out. Neither party may be 
held solely responsible for the ambiguity, since both participated in drafting the 
agreement. It is possible that the phrase "earnest money agreement" could mean an 
agreement to obtain moneys to be placed into escrow in connection with the REPC. 
There was a direct conflict of testimony between Florence and Colbert about 
whether a discussion of the possibility of "flipping" the property took place during 
the negotiation of the agreement. Although the trial court made no specific finding 
on this point, the ruling of the court must be understood to have found that no such 
discussion occurred. The court, having observed the witnesses, must be sustained in 
this finding. (R519) 
Fatal Flaw 
The fatal flaw in the court's finding is that it can only be reached if the court 
ignores or gives no meaning to two of the major terms of the Agreement and 
restricts the definition of "closing" to exclude the assignment of the property. The 
clear weight of the evidence presented at trial show the trial court's finding on these 
issues to be clearly erroneous. The trial court found Colbert understood the 
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agreement to be, "a typical 'hard money' lending arrangement5 in which he agreed 
to pay points and interest for a short-term loan."(R 519) A finding that this 
understanding is more consistent with the written agreement ignores the express 
written term of the agreement which designate the agreement as an escrow money 
agreement and establishes an agreed repayment date. 
Escrow Money Agreement 
Florence testified that Colbert's ability to return the loan for points and 
interest was only available to Colbert if he and his partner decided not to go forward 
with the project before the earnest money in the REPC became non-refundable. (TR 
13-17, 19, 24, 33-40,49-50) Colbert admitted that he was aware of Florence's 
understanding on this point. (TR 84-85) In other words, If Colbert withdrew the 
earnest money and returned it to Florence before October 24, 2005, only points and 
interest were due, but if the earnest money became non-refundable, so that 
Florence's money was at risk in the project, the $90,000 premium became due. This 
understanding makes sense of the term used to designate the agreement as an 
5
 No evidence of what a typical hard money lending arrangement might be was 
presented at trial. Wikipedia defines the term in part as, "A hard money loan is a 
specific type of asset-based loan financing through which a borrower receives funds 
secured by the value of a parcel of real estate. This definition disqualifies Colbert's 
claim. 
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"escrow money agreement" and the specifying of October 24 as the "agreed 
repayment date." Nothing about Colbert's interpretation of the agreement makes 
sense of these express written terms. 
Assignment as Closing 
Florence testified that Colbert discussed the possibility of an assignment of 
the property and assured Florence that he would be entitled to the $90,000.00 
premium should that occur. (TR 12-13) Colbert admitted that he had lied in other 
contexts to maximize his recovery in this project. (TR 82-83, 92) None the less, the 
trial court's findings exclude assignment of the property as a method for closing the 
project. Even assuming, however, that no discussion of "flipping" took place, it 
does not necessarily follow that the assignment of the property cannot constitute a 
closing of the project. It is clear that Colbert was aware of the potential for 
assigning the property because he is designated as "Chad Colbert and or Assigns" in 
the REPC. (R 28-34, 53-59, 212-218 and Appendix "B") There is no testimony 
that the possibility of assigning the property for a profit was expressly excluded and 
the written agreement certainly does not do so. Colbert executed a document 
entitled closing statement in connection with the assignment of the property. (P 3) 
He testified that the closing of the assignment was a closing. (TR 79, 87-89) The 
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finding of the trial court that the assignment—and the closing connected with it— 
was not a closing of the project is not supported by the evidence in the record. 
Conduct of the parties: 
Courts have given great weight to the parties contemporaneous practical 
interpretation of the contract Hardinge Co., v. EIMCO Corp., 266 P.2d 494 (Utah 
1954) Applying this criterion demonstrates that the weight of the evidence does not 
support the finding of the trial court. Colbert's need for the loan was immediate. 
Florence paid the money within twenty-four hours of Colbert's request. There was 
no opportunity to do due diligence on the investment, nor was the loan secured in 
any way. These are not circumstances which accompany the "typical 'hard money' 
lending arrangement." Colbert did not ultimately purchase and develop the 
property; he assigned it for one million dollars. Colbert's payment of $100,000.00 
to Florence was not triggered by the agreed repayment date, but rather by the 
closing of the assignment. After having assigned all of his interest in the subject 
property, Colbert lied to his business partner about the closing, hoping to prevent 
him from getting his share of the deal. (TR 82-83) Finally, when Florence called 
Colbert to ask about the balance of his money, instead of telling Florence that he 
had received all he was entitled to and more, Colbert lied to Florence, telling 
18 
Florence that he had made more on this project than Colbert had. (TR 92) These 
actions demonstrate that Colbert intended the assignment of the property to be a 
closing of the project. The clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that the trial 
court erred in finding the parties intended the agreement to be a typical hard money 
loan. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this court construe the Agreement to 
require Colbert to pay the $80,000.00 balance of the premium due as a result of the 
assignment of the subject property. In the alternative, Appellant requests that the 
court return the case to the trial court for the purpose of making findings regarding 
the intent of the parties in light of the express contract terms not previously 
construed by the trial court. 
DATED this 1% day of August, 2010. 
PETERSON & NYKAMP 
-A 
/s/ Lawrence R. Peterson 
Lawrence R. Peterson 
Attorney for Appellant Casey Florence 
L . 
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I hereby certify that a copy of APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed to the 
following this 18th day of August 2010: 
Justin T. Ashworth (9474) 
PRANNO ASHWORTH LAW, Pile 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/s/ Lawrence R. Peterson 
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Third Judicial District 
MAR 28 2010 
SALT LAKM CdlJ [^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT De^ut> c,e* 
IN AWD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CASEY FLORENCE, 
Plaintiff, 
TS. 
FINAL RULING 
CASE NO. 070904712 
CHADCOLBERT, 
Judge Michele M. Christiansen 
Defendant. i 
The parties came for trial of the above-captioned matter on May 7,2009, and 
thereafter submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Plaintiff Casey 
Florence was present and represented by Lawrence R. Peterson and Bradley G. Nykamp. 
Defendant Chad Colbert was present and represented by Justin T. Ashworth. The Court 
considered the evidence and arguments presented at trial, the written submissions of the 
parties, and the case authorities and entered its Ruling on August 10,2009. Thereafter, 
Plaintiff Casey Florence (hereinafter "Florence" or "Plaintiff) filed an appeal 
challenging this Court's dismissal of his claim. The Court of Appeals dismissed the 
appeal on December 17, 2009, because no final order was entered by the Court. On 
December 29,2009, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requesting the Court to either enter new findings of fact or conclusions of 
law or hold a new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to justify the 
/ ^ 
Court's August 10, 2009 Ruling and/or that the Court made an error of law. Specifically, 
Florence argues that the Court's "conclusion is not supported by the evidence at trial and 
can only be reached if the Court ignores contract provisions and improperly imports into 
the case a requirement that the agreement meets certain undefined standards of 
'commercial reasonableness.'" He also contends that if the Court had applied the proper 
contract interpretation principles,1 it would not have reached its conclusion. Defendant 
Chad Colbert (hereinafter "Colbert" or "Defendant") filed an Objection to the new trial as 
well as an Opposition Memorandum.2 Based upon the written submissions of the parties, 
the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial3 and hereby enters its:: 
1
 Such as interpreting the contract as a whole, harmonizing terms, and construing terms 
by their ordinary meanings as opposed to the Court's alleged "restrictive" interpretation. 
2
 In his Objection, Colbert argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider 
the motion for a new trial because the Court of Appeals had not yet issued a remittitur pursuant 
to rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(2). After the 
parties submitted their briefs and request to submit, the Court of Appeals issued the remittitur 
(February 24,2010). Although Colbert was correct that this Court did not have jurisdiction at 
the time of Florence's motion, it now does, and because Colbert filed an Opposition 
Memorandum, it did not prejudice Colbert. Moreover, in his Opposition Memorandum, Colbert 
first argues that Florence's motion is untimely filed. Florence had ten days after the entry of 
judgment to file his motion. Florence's motion was not untimely filed—instead, technically, the 
motion is improper because it concerns a Ruling that is not a final judgment. The court of 
appeals held that his appeal was dismissed because the Court's August 10,2009 Ruling was not 
a final order. However, it would be impractical and not serve any purpose for this Court to insist 
that Florence re-file the motion upon the court's entry of a final order. 
3
 Under rule 59, if there was either insufficient evidence to justify the decision or there 
was an error of law, the Court may (1) grant a new trial, or (2) if the action was tried without a 
jury, "amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions." 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6)-(7). "Although a trial court has broad discretion to decide whether 
to grant relief under this rule, a trial court must grant the motion if the "prior decision was 
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v. 
Turner, 2007 UT 48, P40,164 P.3d 1247 (quotations omitted). On the other hand, the Court has 
-2-
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Casey Florence and Defendant Chad Colbert are residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. This case involves a written agreement entered into by Florence and Colbert on 
September 21,2005, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, concerning certain real property 
located in the State of Idaho (hereinafter "the Property"). 
3. The written agreement entered into by the parties, entitled "Escrow Money 
Agreement," (hereinafter "the Agreement") provides: 
This escrow money agreement between Chad Colbert & Greg Young ("the 
borrowers") and Casey Florence ("the lender") is for $90,000 ninety 
"no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of the circumstances specified 
in Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)." Moon Lake Electric Assoc, Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western Constr,y Jnc. 
161726 125, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Consequently, the court may not amend the decision 
unless it finds there was insufficient evidence to support it or if there was an error of law. 
Conversely, the court must amend if there was (1) insufficient evidence or an error of law and 
(2) finds that it was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 
The Court does not believe it made an error of law in its original Tuling. The Court 
determined the parties' intent based on the evidence and articulated their intent in its findings of 
fact. Florence's argument that the Court should construe contract terms by their ordinary 
meanings as opposed to their "restrictive" meanings is faulty. Utah courts have stated that 
[i]n the construction of contracts . . . words which are used in 
common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of 
evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they 
have for laymen in such daily usage, rather than a restrictive 
meaning which they may have acquired in legal usage. In the 
construction of contracts the purpose is to find and give effect to 
the intention of the contracting parties. 
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982) (quotations omitted) 
(interpreting the term "resident"); see also Mesa Dev. Co. v. Sandy City Corp., 948 P.2d 366, 
369 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
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thousand dollars. 
Terms: 
Chad Colbert & Greg Young, jointly and severally promise to pay the 
original amount of $90,000 together with interest at a rate of 12% annually 
with a 3 point fee if the project is not closed by October 24,2005 which 
date is the agreed repayment date. If borrowers close said project, 
borrowers agree to pay the lender this original loan amount plus an 
additional $90,000 (ninety thousand dollars), payable 14 days after closing. 
4. The terms "project," "closed," "close," and "closing" are not defined in the 
Agreement and the Court finds that each term is subject to differing interpretations. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Agreement is ambiguous.4 
5. Despite reference to Greg Young as a "borrower," the Agreement was .entered 
into and signed only by Colbert and Florence. 
6. Although the Agreement refers to property in Council, Idaho, the parties agree 
and the Court finds that the real property that was the subject of the Agreement is located 
in Caldwell, Canyon County, Idaho. 
7. Defendant represented to Plaintiff that he had the Property under contract and 
asked Florence to loan him $90,000 in additional escrow money to secure the right to 
purchase the Property. 
"Under basic rules of contract interpretation, courts first look to the writing alone to 
determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties." Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth 
Corp., 2009 UT 2, P44,201 P.3d 966. It is "[o]nly where there is ambiguity in the terms of the 
contract may the parties' intent 'be ascertained from extrinsic evidence.'" Giusti v. Sterling 
Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, P44, 201 P.3d 966 (quoting Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State 
Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, P16, 178 P.3d 886). 
-4-
8. During the conversation between the two men about the Agreement/ Florence 
testified that Colbert represented to him that Defendant was desperately in need of a 
short-term bridge loan to secure his right to purchase the Property, that this was a low-risk 
investment for Plaintiff because Defendant had somebody lined up to whom he could 
"flip" or assign the Property for ua million dollars in profit," that the $90,000 was soft or 
refundable earnest money until October 24,2005, and that Colbert's intent was to develop 
the Property but if his financing did not come through and Plaintiffs money became non-
refundable he would pay Florence back his $90,000 with 12% annual interest and points. 
Florence testified that he understood his agreement with Colbert to be that the term 
"projecf' in the Agreement meant to tie up the Property for sufficient time to obtain 
financing or to flip the Property—basically doing anything with the Property to make 
money—and that the term "close" meant finishing the "project" by taking possession of 
the Property, obtaining financing for the development of the Property, or 
flipping/assigning the Property. 
9. Colbert testified at trial that prior to entering into the Agreement with Florence, 
he signed a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") for the Property and that he and Greg 
Young put down $10,000 in earnest money. The REPC signed by Colbert required that 
he put down another $90,000 in thirty days to continue his purchase interest in the 
5
 Because of the Court's determination at trial and again in this Ruling that the 
Agreement is ambiguous, the Court accepted extrinsic evidence at trial to determine the 
intentions of the parties as to the rights and duties required by the Agreement. 
-5-
Property. Colbert heard that Florence was interested in making the bridge loan he needed 
to sustain the interest in Property and the two men talked on September 21,2005. Colbert 
testified that during that conversation, he provided Plaintiff with a quick description of 
the deal-the interest rate he would pay and his plans to develop the Property. Colbert 
claimed that he did not discuss "flipping" or assigning the contract to anyone else during 
his conversation with Plaintiff because at the time he was seeking the bridge loan from 
Florence, Colbert was intending to purchase the Property for seven million dollars and 
obtain additional financing to develop it. Colbert testified that it was only when he failed 
to obtain the funding for buying and developing the Property that he met and assigned the 
purchase contract for the Property to Kevin Howell for $ 1.045 million dollars. Colbert 
testified that he believed he would owe Florence an additional $90,000, as described in 
the Agreement, when he closed on and took possession of the Property and developed the 
"project." Colbert anticipated that to purchase the Property and fully develop the project 
would cost between ten and twelve million dollars. Colbert testified that he entered into 
the Agreement with Florence anticipating atypical "hard money" lending arrangement in 
which he agreed to pay points and interest for a short-term loan. Colbert understood the 
agreement to be that he would pay Florence $180,000 if Defendant purchased the 
Property and acquired the financing necessary to develop the project. Colbert understood 
the term "project" referenced in the Agreement to mean a real estate development on the 
Property and the term "close" to mean his purchasing the Property and obtaining the 
financing for its development. 
-6-
10. Plaintiff agreed to lend Colbert the $90,000. Both parties participated in the 
drafting of the Agreement and on or about September 22,2005, after receiving Colbert's 
signature on the Agreement, Plaintiff wired the $90,000 into an Idaho escrow account. 
11. The Court finds that Colbert's interpretation of the Agreement's terms is 
reasonable and more consistent with the language contained within the Agreement and 
the context surrounding it's creation. Moreover, the Court finds that the evidence 
supports Colbert's testimony because his actions were consistent with his stated intention 
of acquiring and developing the Property (the project) and Ms stated understanding of the 
Agreement, to wit: 
a. In the summer of 2005, Colbert located a tract of land in and around 
Caldwell, Canyon County, Idaho that he believed as having great 
development potential; 
b. Prior to entering into any agreement to purchase the Property, Colbert 
sought to locate sources of financing for the purchase and development of 
the project; 
c. Colbert declined the advances of Peterson Development to acquire the 
Properly7 for its own purposes so that he could realize the profits from 
developing the project himself; 
d. Colbert associated with Greg Young who provided the money for the initial 
earnest money deposit and was to provide or arrange for financing for the 
acquisition and development of the project; 
-7-
e. In August 2005, after providing a Capacity to Fund letter from Action 
Creates Wealth to the seller of the Property to demonstrate his ability to 
obtain ftmding for the development of the project, Colbert entered into the 
REPC to purchase the Property; 
f. Throughout, Colbert continued to work toward development of the project. 
g. By late October 2005, the anticipated financing for the purchase of the 
Property and the development of the project had fallen through and 
Defendant began to seek other alternatives to defaulting on the REPC. 
h. Colbert assigned his right to purchase the Property to Kevin Howell 
Construction, Inc. on November 3,2005. 
12. Colbert never closed on the Property or the project as he was unable to secure 
the financing required to complete the purchase of the land and the development of the 
project. Defendant assigned his rights under the REPC to Kevin Howell Construction, 
Inc. on November 3,2005. Colbert was paid a little over a million dollars for assigning 
his purchase interest in the Property once Howell-Murdoch Development Corporation 
completed the purchase of and closed on the Property on November 14,2005. 
13. On or about November 30,2005, Defendant made out a check to Plaintiff in 
the amount of $100,000, which check was delivered to Florence on or about December 5, 
2005. This check represented Defendant's repayment of the $90,000 principle, plus 
incorrectly calculated points and interest, along with an extra amount for future business. 
-8-
14. Plaintiff filed the instant action against Colbert seeking judgment in the 
amount of $80,000, plus interest, against Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Jurisdiction of this matter and venue are proper in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were parties to a written agreement wherein Florence 
agreed to loan Colbert $90,000 and Colbert agreed to "pay the original amount of $90,000 
together with interest at a rate of 12% annually with a 3 point fee if the project [wa]s not 
closed by October 24,2005," and to pay the "original loan amount plus an additional 
$90,000 (ninety thousand dollars)," if "borrowers close said project" 
3. Because the written agreement between the parties is sparse and does not 
contain definitions of key terms, specifically the terms "project" and "close," the Court 
concludes that the words used to express the intention of the parties are insufficient so 
that the Agreement may be and was understood to reach two different meanings. Thus, 
the Agreement is ambiguous and, therefore, the Court must look to parol evidence to 
determine the intent of the parties and the meaning of the Agreement. 
4. From the evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that the Agreement 
meant that Plaintiff was entitled to the additional $90,000 if Defendant secured the 
financing required to complete the purchase of the Property and the development of the 
project. As Colbert did not close on the project (obtain the required financing to purchase 
-9-
the Property and develop the project) but assigned his purchase interest in the Property to 
Kevin Howell, Plaintiff was not entitled to the additional monies and was paid the amount 
due under the Agreement. 
5. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim is dismissed. 
This is the final Order of the Court-no other order need be submitted. 
DATED this Ifj day of March, 2010, 
BY THE COURT: 
Michele M. Christiansen 
DISTRICT COURT JUDCjE 
" C M S ' 
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PROPERTYAPPftESQ:^ 142^8 Indiana Ave - -._, HM: 424fl409S 
13. FJUWCRGi*SffiiiBgfc^hT£^ 
toft pkw« on *A P/«B9rty pr^lotJ»<5^ of flvi CfiWic^ 
HOto*W^t*K»m!*fU!Hoii^n^ 
whP3*etti*lMHinalNftqpcftrs^ 
A t t W ^ a * & * » l ^ « w d * * * A € a L W 
54. NOXJDU&WEEDS; BLttE*0fth«p« f^lyto1l»Stoh>crfk*^ 
ftftxtoui «*>aa %rA your ofettgaouni: 2» n/t ownar of property, contact yanf focal county vdomton cffw». 
15. MINERAL RIGHTS: Any •*$*« ****** ngnawwtaita 
16. WATER RIGHTS: Owcripfmi of wttw righto, w**ray*tm*, %w«l, apnr>g»« *5*v. djfch*,diteft rigfif*, etc., tf any, tfu>t ft* appvffriiftrt 
ftcraioihtfiawmwoniiruiBrffoconne^ 
17.fUSK0PLQS8iPrtoffeda«ngcrfJh^ 
oroiti^dMitivcM^em^iuicf 10 c f o ^ 
11. Hudness&Aift&HouR&AtHid^ 
wher»>Bl>vva^nN5plopcj1yb^Vck^l«ahid, Afcwfin«tt^^«lli*Q*Wud*i^$aUi^^ 
b^ftoi4«yfc^fii^tytte«iatoaftoahos»to^ TJ*<fii»fo^<cft»ny»afKt<itRKStM^ 
pcflamorfrtiStetioflfyMjfedtytxefc^ TW*^daydha«b©thfd3yaJ»ffncft««ole)iecu^rv 
19»SEV&R/U3tUrr;Mti9CflaofaUiyoi»«r^^ 
unsnforma&binanyfcjpe^ 
20. FAC3IMa^TltAJi|SiRSS(QN! F*otoito«»r»**imAic</»<ttmis^ 
and ekxftmntc tipaemMredt *fcnau*»* by cignjng an erfckwi dooumant 
21. ADDITIONAL CONrtNGCNC£3 AND COSTS: Tf» ckwino of thte lrsj«Miciio* b »«&$«* v*art ***** «*t*fee»far» «f %«w«fo*» 
foifctarinfi ^Stae<Kfc& &x^ 
subtect to ftgn program requirements. ta&tfita,itop«tte^tttit&»ficQn&^ 
COSTS CONTINGENCIES 
l*tVw*S«a«»*»« 
TH» Nw jFfcWW^C— *W 
1UH* Kucn m 
*6*« VACANT LAMft /"V*Of A8C **P JUtf *0KC 
I -«l 
g 30 05 D3;20p 
flue 30 05 02:42p 
JOHhSQN 
mar)ah hopp 
A«* IS OS 07;30a Chad Co lber t 
801-377-3777 
208*933-2797 p-
C80U SS5-4SS2 p*3 
vfeoecwrv AODafeMb t4»3* INtWAXA AVE* tfAMPA 
. « * . 43HCKfl?K 
ha eumifffppn*»^Mi-iiXt»Wawf%>nfl.ti>##f 
* y * r " '"•"•in »«»• w » i « » n W M tin*. M»< 
i**t*cftrt*UtW* 
i n ^ Hi 
«ft 
TWWMHIMIAM 
i iqpVi • i n 4 *^wm**mm$* 
7m 
m 
* • 
'mmmm^^m^SMTm^mmn&^ 
* * * * * * £ * ( « > w i t * »* • WMJTE& e u * ACSMY iw»w»4WMS>^tN«.« w*c*E©AOtirr UC.IHt 
State* as X A . IHB i M v « t r «wtt»| « • * •» fifeUCUft) »MiHi<Mi«»A«WrMrfli»SeU£Ht5>. 
OTgMi Mfcrfy T in< wff ^ f <i» "M*! I f 11(1) 
- - - - - - •IMplHf II——ii I WlMtNil " • * • 
•4MA» 
«*M«M4S«I«MMI •^••WP* 6*^#*wfvt*WKnRW^TH^ *«err«g«sH!ii*0wv A 
>=^m ?i 
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flu* 30 05 02:43p nar i^h hop? 20B-S33-e737 p. 6 
»UC i5 OS 0 7 ; 3 l « Chad Colbert (601) SCS-«662 p.A 
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RE-15 COMPENSATION AGREEMENT WITH BUYER 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. BEFORE SIGNING, " f t f J K S P R E 
DOCUMENT^ INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS, IF YOU HAVE ANY j M g n O N ^ 
- a ^ L T W U R A T T O I « E Y J U « M O R ACCOUMTAWT BEFORE SIGNING 
i . BUYER Neme<») chrt ct^j^qzJ***^ 
8UYER tfesirei to purchase, leaee, or option the following reel estate* Type of property. 
| | Residential i | Residential Income 1 | Commerasi X Vacant Land I I Other 
Applicable area , Oty(s), County(a). Zip Cod«(s). etc *** * Canyon 
Other Descnption (ie, geographical area, price, ace) 
and. where** the ynderalflned part.es desire to enter mto this formal agreement « £ » * • ^ T L ^ ^ 
paymeotfracelpt of arry real estate commission rasmtkiQ from the purchase and/or (ease of the above described type of propo 
THIS » NOT A BROKER *£r*fMSSENTA*riO" AGR€G*£NT, This * an agreement lor compensation for services ta a *curtom 
as d e f i n e d Idaho law. A c^iyerorseMerU 
orsolleraiidlhetH»keraQe*reeina**>erete^ NotypeofBgetxyrepmeenteboamay 
assumed by a brokerage, buyer or seller or created orally or by implication 
Z AGENGY D ISCLOSURE C O N F I R M A T I O N : * " • ^ ^ * » received. has read, and understands the AGENCY 
DISCLOSURE BROCHURE (prapered by the Idaho Rael Estate Commission.) 
3* T E R M O F A G R E E M E N T : The term of this Agreement shall commence on . tt.1S.06 and will espi* 
ia 11:59 p.m. an date 06«n5.06 , , or upon dotmgof escrow of such property per^atee throuQh this aoreemefi 
IT 4 C O M P E N S A T I O N O F B R O K E R : Broker shall be compensated in the followtng ways: Check those that ^pa 
* I i K W t h o a m o o r t v t a e u M e r t t o a W o * ^ 
id MLS or otherwise, the Brokerage fee shall be the amount paid by the seller to the aforementioned Broke** out not less \t\ 
a „ % of the gross selUnp price or $ dollars. 
X B. tf#tepcepQftvlaM«Mi»loetto^ 
sgraasthatOwdiolierwiibepeldefeeofnotlessllian 2 * of soiling pnoe or $ . The Broker shall feet saak 
obtsin this fee through t ie transaction paid by the Seller. If the fee cannot be obtained through the Seller, the BUYER win 
responiible for such fee stated above 
» This compensation start apply to transactions made for whtcrt BUYER enters into a contract during the ordinal term of n 
7/ Agreement or euhng any eoension of such ongthel or esoended term, end shell « u e apply to transaction* for which BUYER en* 
a mto a contract within $o„ days after tNs Agreement empires is terminated, if the property acquired by the BUYER was submitted 
» writing to the BUYER by Broker pursuant to Section One hereof during the original term or extension of the term of this Agreemc 
» Tna fee snail t * paw at c i c ^ u i t f e s a e t h e r w f c ^ ^ 
x authorized to pay the above mentioned compensation at dosing. 
a & OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
Keller trVtmame 
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